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THE NEW YORK HOUSING MERCHANT WARRANTY
STATUTE: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
For centuries, courts applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, or
"let the buyer beware," to all sales transactions.' Although courts
ceased applying this ancient maxim to personal property sales dur-
ing the nineteenth century, they continued to apply the rule in sales
of real property. 2 This doctrine traditionally left home buyers with-
out an effective remedy for defects resulting from poor workman-
ship. In recent decades, however, courts in many states, recognizing
the harsh effects of caveat emptor, have extended the concept of im-
plied warranties to housing sales. 3 Last year, the New York State
Legislature followed the lead of these courts by enacting a statutory
housing merchant warranty.4
Although the New York housing merchant warranty provides
substantial consumer protection, it does not completely fulfill the
goals which inspired its adoption. The statute neither adequately
protects reasonable consumer expectations and reliance nor suffi-
ciently encourages the construction of safe and habitable homes.
1 Note, Minnesota Statutory Warranties on New Homes-An Examination and Proosal, 64
MINN. L. REv. 413 (1980).
2 See Leo Bearman, Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule,
14 VAND. L. REv. 541, 541-42 (1961); see also infra text accompanying notes 32-62.
3 As the New York Court of Appeals noted recently in Caceci v. Di Canio Constr.
Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 58, 526 N.E.2d 266, 268, 530 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (1988), "[o]ver 25
States now recognize some form of an implied warranty of habitability or skillful con-
struction in connection with the sale of homes." (citing Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala.
439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971)); accord Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242,
678 P.2d 427 (1984); Coney v. Stewart, 263 Ark. 148, 562 S.W.2d 619 (1978); Pollard v.
Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Cosmo-
politan Homes v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983); Greentree Condominium Ass'n v.
RSP Corp., 36 Conn. Supp. 160, 415 A.2d 248 (1980); Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418
(Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Park v. Sohn, 89
Ill. 2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972);
Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1985); Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d
629 (Me. 1969); Weeks v. Slavick Bldrs., Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, afd,
384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); Allison v. Home Sav. Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 847
(Mo. App. 1982); Chandler v. Madsen, 197 Mont. 234, 642 P.2d 1028 (1982); Norton v.
Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398
A.2d 1283 (1979); Earls v. Link, Inc., 38 N.C. App. 204, 247 S.E.2d 617 (1978); Yepsen
v. Burgess, 269 Ore. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288
A.2d 771 (1972); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970);
Sedlmajer v.Jones, 275 N.W.2d 631 (S.D. 1979); Hollen v. Leadership Homes, Inc., 502
S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975);
Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d
1275 (Wyo. 1975).
4 Housing Merchant Implied Warranty, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777 (McKinney
Supp. 1990).
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Consequently, the New York legislature should amend the statute
by raising the warranty standards of "skillful manner" and "material
defects," and by extending builder liability to all significant housing
defects, regardless of fault. Furthermore, the warranty should cover
all defects, patent or latent, that a builder does not explicitly
disclaim.
After explaining the application and effects of traditional doc-
trines governing sales, this Note will survey both the demise of these
doctrines and the concurrent rise of implied warranties in the sales
of goods. In particular, this Note will examine the policies leading
to the development of implied warranties and their recent applica-
tion to the sales of new homes. Finally, after outlining the basic pro-
visions of the New York statutory warranty, this Note will discuss the
problems created by the warranty's limited scope and will propose
several corrective amendments.
I
BACKGROUND
Home sales, unlike sales of goods, usually take place in a two-
stage transaction, with the seller giving the buyer an opportunity to
verify the seller's title and to arrange for financing.5 Typically, the
parties first sign a sales contract committing themselves to the bar-
gain.6 The seller often will require the buyer to deposit "earnest
money" when the parties sign the sales contract. 7 If the buyer takes
the initiative, then the parties can bargain for covenants in the sales
contract or the deed during contract negotiations. Subsequently,
once the purchaser has verified the vendor's title, the sale of the
home ends in a closing, during which the vendor delivers a deed of
title to the purchaser in exchange for the purchase price.8
5 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1968, 1968
Legis. Doc. No. 65(A) at 76 [hereinafter REPORT]. If the buyer purchases the home with-
out verifying that the seller actually owns the home, the true owner may eject the buyer
from the premises even though the buyer purchased the home. Furthermore, the buyer
must research the title of the land in the local recording office to ensure that the seller
acquired the land from someone who held good title. If a thorough search reveals that
the seller acquired the land through a valid chain of title, the buyer can purchase the
land with the assurance that the sale will effectively transfer all ownership rights to the
buyer.
6 Id.
7 Id. Earnest money refers to a sum of money (often 10% of the selling price)
deposited with the seller to ensure that the buyer is "earnest" in his desire to purchase
the property. In modern practice, real estate brokers generally place these funds in an
escrow account.
8 Id.
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A. Traditional Doctrines Governing Sales of Homes
1. Merger
Traditionally, once the buyer accepted the deed, he absolved
the vendor of all duties under the sales contract. Under the merger
doctrine, all contract obligations "merged" into the deed when the
seller delivered it to the buyer.9 If the vendor intended to fulfill
additional obligations, the parties had to list the obligations in the
deed.' 0
Although the merger doctrine produces an equitable result in
many commercial transactions, it unfairly prejudices the purchaser
in sales of residential homes." 1 The doctrine presumes an arm's
length bargain by individuals capable of safeguarding their own in-
terests.1 2 In a typical housing sale, however, purchasers lack the so-
phistication necessary to protect these interests adequately, and
often fail to inspect homes in more than a cursory fashion prior to
closing. 13
In this century, courts increasingly have recognized the doc-
trine's potentially harsh effects in housing sales and have moved to
limit its scope. For example, they have broadened the application of
the "collateral promises" exception. Originally, obligations that
builders typically accepted merged into the deed, but any unusual
promises did not; courts deemed the latter "collateral" to the
deed. 14 Significantly, modern courts commonly have characterized
all written warranties in the sales contract as collateral. 15 These
9 See, e.g., Cox v. Wilson, 109 Ga. App. 652, 137 S.E.2d 47 (1964) (holding that all
prior agreements merged in the deed); Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188
N.E.2d 780 (1963) (following the traditional rule that the vendor gives no implied war-
ranties since a deed merges the provisions of the contract), aff'd on other grounds, 31111. 2d
189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964).
10 See, e.g., Coutrakon, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780; Disbrow v. Harris, 122
N.Y. 362, 25 N.E. 356 (1890) (although the builder agreed to convey a home "in good
condition," the buyer could not recover for defects in the home because he had ac-
cepted the deed); see also REPORT, supra note 5, at 55.
11 REPORT, supra note 5, at 76-77. For a discussion of the evolution of the merger
doctrine, see generally Ernest F. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing
Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 857 (1967).
12 REPORT, supra note 5, at 76.
13 See infra note 77 for a discussion of the unequal bargaining power of parties to a
housing sale.
14 E.g., Duncan v. McAdams, 222 Ark. 143, 257 S.W.2d 568 (1953); Bull v. Willard,
9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850). See also Bearman, supra note 2, at 548 (discussing the
collateral promise exception); REPORT, supra note 5, at 77 (explaining the early meaning
of "collateral promises"); Annotation, 38 A.L.R.2d 1307 (1954) (discussing whether
deed merges or supersedes antecedent contract obligations of the vendor); Bull v. Wil-
lard, 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850)
15 E.g., Re v. Magness Constr. Co., 49 Del. 377, 117 A.2d 78 (Super. Ct. 1955);
Russ v. Lakeview Dev., Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d 641 (City Ct. 1954). One court reasoned that
warranties, which are never aimed at conveying the property, are by their nature collat-
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courts have reasoned that a deed's purpose is to convey the prop-
erty, nothing more. Warranties contained in the sales contract do
not pertain to the conveyance of property, and therefore they are
necessarily collateral to the main purpose of the deed.1 6
New York courts generally have held that the parties' intent de-
termines whether the vendor's obligations merge into the deed.' 7
Therefore, if parties intend for a warranty to survive the closing,
then the court will give effect to that intent.18 Some courts have
inferred the parties' intent. For example, in Price v. Woodward-Brown
Realty Co., 19 a supreme court held that the parties did not intend
merger when a seller delivered the deed to an incomplete house
because the seller had not completed his performance of the con-
tract. 20 Another early court held, in Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc.,21 that
the parties did not intend for warranties concerning latent defects to
merge in the deed.22 In yet another case, Gomes v. Ern-Roc Homes,
Inc., 23 the builder offered a one-year guaranty regarding leakage to
induce the purchaser to accept title. Because the builder had given
the guaranty in order to pass title to the buyer, the supreme court
reasoned that the parties had intended the guaranty to survive the
closing.24 Because of New York's focus on the parties' intent, the
merger doctrine seldom has barred breach of warranty claims.
2. Caveat Emptor
The merger doctrine denied recovery for breaches of express
covenants in housing sales contracts, and, correspondingly, caveat
emptor denied recovery for breaches of implied warranties. 25 Caveat
eral to the main purpose of the deed. Greenfield v. Liberty Constr. Corp., 81 N.Y.S.2d
550 (Sup. Ct. 1948); see also Bearman, supra note 2, at 548 (citing Greenfield and explain-
ing the collateral purpose doctrine).
16 See, e.g., Greenfield, 81 N.Y.S.2d 550.
17 REPORT, supra note 5, at 58 (citing Russ, 133 N.Y.S.2d 641).
18 See, e.g., Russ, 133 N.Y.S.2d 641; see also Roberts, supra note 11, at 858 ("The
conventional technique 6f keeping the merger rule within the bounds of reason is illus-
trated in New York, where it is said that whether a vendor's obligation has merged into
the deed is a question of intent.").
19 190 N.Y.S. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1921), affid mem., 201 A.D. 837, 192 N.Y.S. 947 (1922).
20 Id.
21 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
22 Id.
23 70 Misc. 2d 658, 334 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
24 Id.
25 Caveat emptor traditionally applied to the sale of goods as well. Swett v. Colgate,
20Johns. 196 (N.Y. 1822) (holding that the buyer who bought by description exercised
his own judgment and bought at his own risk); Seixas and Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48
(N.Y. 1804) (dismissing the suit based on caveat emptor because the plaintiff (a servant)
and the defendant both had opportunity to examine the cargo, and neither determined
it to be worthless). See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE
Lj. 1133, 1179 (1931).
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emptor,26 or "let the buyer beware," placed the risk of defective
housing on the buyer.27 Buyers without express warranties had no
claim against the builder for defects discovered after closing. 28 For
this reason, caveat emptor required the buyer to inspect his purchase
carefully. If his inspection revealed a defect, the purchaser could
either reject the item or renegotiate the price. Purchasers less confi-
dent in their ability to inspect adequately could bargain for an ex-
press warranty. 29
New York Real Property Law section 251, enacted in 1909,
codified the doctrine of caveat emptor in sales of real property. Ac-
cording to the statute, "[a] covenant is not implied in a conveyance
of real property, whether the conveyance contains any special cove-
nant or not. '"30 In applying the statute, New York courts have held
that a buyer of real estate received no promises, warranties, or cove-
nants other than those expressly made by the seller.3'
26 The judicial doctrine of caveat emptor originated in the fifteenth century and has
gained importance through the years. DEP'T OF THE A-rORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO,
REPORT OF THE ONTARIO LAw REFORM COMM'N ON TRADE SALES OF NEW HOUSES 6
(1968). Law reports in the 1600's referred to the doctrine directly, and, in 1628, Sir
Edward Coke declared that caveat emplor was the general law in sales situations. See
Bearman, supra note 2, at 542. The doctrine gained importance during the late 16th and
17th centuries with the rise of English trade society and became even more prevalent
during the early 1800's when laissez faire developed. This political philosophy led
judges to look upon the purchase of land as a "game of chance," and for this reason,
judges readily accepted the effects of caveat emptor on sales of land. Hamilton, supra note
25, at 1187. Hamilton's survey of the history of caveat emptor is still regarded as "the
classic work on the subject." McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283, 1287
(1979); see also Roberts, supra note 11, at 836 n.1 ("Hamilton's survey of the lineage of
caveat emptor is such a classic that there is no need to footnote in detail-the article
speaks for itself.").
27 The doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to intentional misrepresentations.
For a discussion of the effect of fraud on caveat emptor, see Bearman, supra note 2, at 561-
66.
28 E.g., Eastman v. Britton, 175 A.D. 476, 162 N.Y.S. 587 (App. Div. 1916) (per
curiam) (reversing a judgment based on an oral promise that the foundation was sound
because of the parol evidence rule, and noting that no implied warranty existed).
29 Roberts, supra note 11, at 836-37.
30 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 251 (McKinney 1989).
31 E.g., Eastman, 175 A.D. 476, 162 N.Y.S. 587 (no implied warranty regarding
outside wall); Garlock v. Lane, 15 Barb. 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (covenants not implied
in a warranty deed); Bradt v. Church, 39 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 262 (App. Div. 1886) (covenants
not implied in quitclaim deed), aff'd, 110 N.Y. 537, 18 N.E. 357 (1888); Pierce v. Fuller,
36 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 179 (App. Div. 1885) (no covenants implied in quitclaim deed); Spano
v. Perry, 59 Misc. 2d 1062, 301 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (section 251 excludes an
implied warranty of fitness in the sale of a completed home); McDermott v. Books, 128
Misc. 17, 217 N.Y.S. 181 (Sup. Ct.), aj'd, 218 A.D. 849, 218 N.Y.S. 809 (App. Div. 1926)
(no implied covenant arises from conveyance of realty); Lewy v. Clark Ave., Inc., 128
Misc. 16, 217 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (no implied covenant arises from a conveyance
of real estate).
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B. The Rise of Consumerism in the Sale of Goods
The Industrial Revolution introduced mass production to con-
sumers, who in turn demanded both higher quality goods from
merchants and judicial protection of their interests.3 2 In response
to these growing consumer demands, courts gradually relaxed the
rigid application of the caveat emptor doctrine. First, courts began to
infer an implied warranty of merchantability if the seller customarily
dealt in the goods in question, and if the buyer had no opportunity
to inspect.3 3 During the nineteenth century, courts extended this
implied warranty of merchantability to sales of personal property
regardless of the buyer's opportunity to inspect.3 4
Several policies guided the development of a warranty of
merchantability in sales of personal property. In particular, a
number of nineteenth century judges circumvented caveat emptor in
cases in which the buyer had relied on the seller's skill and judgment
in making the purchase.35 For example, in Brown v. Edgington,3 6 the
seller, a rope dealer, sold the buyer, a wine merchant, a crane rope
to lift wine from his cellar. The rope broke while the wine
merchant's servant hauled wine to the street.37 The court refused to
apply caveat emptor because the buyer had relied on the seller's
judgment.38
Today, all states except Louisiana have adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which implies a warranty of
merchantability in sales of goods,3 9 but not in sales of real estate.40
32 Bearman, supra note 2, at 542.
33 Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Campb. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815); Laing v.
Fidgeon, 6 Taunt. 108, 4 Campb. 169, 128 Eng. Rep. 974 (C.P. 1815). See also Paul G.
Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. LJ. 633,
636 (1965) (discussing the nineteenth century origin of the warranty); William L. Pros-
ser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 123-25 (1943)
(noting the limited nature of the early warranty).
34 For a discussion of the history of the warranty of merchantability, see Ingrid M.
Hillinger, The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 747, 788
(1983).
35 See id. at 790. The U.S. Supreme Court had imposed warranty liability on a man-
ufacturer in 1883, holding that "upon clearer grounds of justice, the fundamental in-
quiry must always be whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the buyer
had the right to rely and necessarily relied on the judgment of the seller and not upon
his own." Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116 (1884).
36 133 Eng. Rep. 751 (C.P. 1841).
37 Id. at 753.
38 Id. at 756-57; accord Jones v. Just, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 197 (1868); Bigge v. Parkinson,
158 Eng. Rep. 758 (1862).
39 U.C.C. § 2-314 reads in full:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the prem-
ises or elsewhere is a sale.
1990] 759
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The U.C.C. warranty of merchantability applies whether or not the
buyer actually relied on the seller's skills. 4 1 It presumes that
merchants understand the manufacturing process better than the
consumer. Because of the sellers' presumed knowledge, the U.C.G.
imposes responsibility on them regardless of their actual knowledge
or skills. 42
Consumer expectations also influenced the adoption of the
warranty of merchantability. 43 The U.C.C. drafters recognized that
consumers often have reasonable expectations about the goods they
purchase, but do not insist on listing their expectations in a written
contract.44 For example, car buyers expect that a car will steer
properly, but few require the seller to expressly promise adequate
steering. In contrast to the doctrine of caveat emptor, the warranty of
merchantability protects the buyer's reasonable expectations about
the quality of the car's steering.45 The warranty of merchantability
does not require the seller to deliver higher quality goods than the
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warran-
ties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
See generally Haskell, supra note 33, at 634-35 (explaining U.C.C. § 2-314).
40 Courts could construe housing as a kind of "good" to bring it within the scope of
the U.C.C., but most have declined to do so. See, e.g., Fink v. Denbeck, 206 Neb. 462,
293 N.W.2d 398 (1980); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982) (over-
ruled on other grounds by Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.
1987)); Sponseller v. Meltebeke, 280 Or. 361, 570 P.2d 974 (1977).
41 See Note, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability-Explanation and
Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REV. 185, 211 (1978) (authored by Holly Keesling Towle).
Today's warranty of merchantability also applies regardless of the special knowledge of
the seller. Hillinger, supra note 34, at 799. See generally Haskell, supra note 33, at 649
(discussing no-fault liability and sellers' lack of expertise).
42 See Hillinger, supra note 34, at 795-96 (citing Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton,
110 U.S. 108, 116 (1883)).
43 Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 323.
44 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 1 (1987). For further discussion, see Friedrich Kessler,
The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE LJ. 262, 278 (1964); Pros-
ser, supra note 33, at 123-25.
45 Haskell, supra note 33, at 634-35.
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buyer reasonably expects, 46 but gives effect to the parties' unarticu-
lated contractual agreements about quality,47 and responds to com-
mon perceptions of fairness and justice.48
Concern for public safety also led to the warranty of
merchantability. Courts have responded to this concern for safety
in sales of food,49 as well as in sales of other goods.50 Implying a
warranty of merchantability promotes safety by encouraging
merchants to sell only safe goods to the public. Courts recognized
that retailers are in a better position than consumers to determine
which manufacturers reliably and responsibly manufacture safe
goods, and to purchase supplies only from them.51
Many courts view the warranty of merchantability primarily as a
policing device,5 2 holding the merchant liable for unmerchantable
goods, regardless of fault.5 3 Because the merchant can sue suppli-
ers who actually cause the defect, the warranty ultimately places the
loss on the party responsible for it. 54 When sellers are unable to
46 The warranty requires only average or medium quality. Id at 634. To approxi-
mate buyer expectations, the warranty imposes no responsibility for patent defects,
those defects "which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed" to
the buyer. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b); see Haskell, supra note 33, at 635.
47 Hillinger, supra note 34, at 756. Dean Prosser analyzed implied warranty of
merchantability cases up to 1945 and argued that most courts found an "implied agree-
ment in fact." Prosser, supra note 33, at 125. The view that the warranty protects buy-
ers' "reasonable, unarticulated quality expectations finds support in the comments to
section 2-314, judicial interpretations of that section, and Dean Prosser's comments."
Hillinger, supra note 34, at 757 (citations omitted).
48 Professor Kirgis explains that a law that responds solely to common perceptions
of fairness or justice would "protect the weaker party when a loss arises from a private
transaction or occurrence, unless the weaker party caused the loss through some fault of
his own." Frederic L. Kirgis, Frances Lewis Law Center Project: A Statutory Approach to Im-
plied Warranties on New Residential Construction, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1979).
Kirgis' thesis is that a fairness-oriented approach is compatible with an efficiency-ori-
ented approach to warranties in the sales of new homes.
49 In holding a manufacturer of contaminated sausage liable for the death of a
child, a court said the "implied warranty was not based on any reliance by the buyer
upon the representations of the seller, or upon his skill and judgment, but was grounded
squarely upon the public policy of protecting the public health." Jacob E. Decker &
Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 616, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1942); accord Wiedeman v.
Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1887); Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 51 (1869); Griggs
Canning Co. v.Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
50 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
51 See Hillinger, supra note 34, at 799 (citing Griggs Canning Co., 139 Tex. 623, 633,
164 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1942)). "[I]t is the duty of the court... to make it in the best
interest of manufacturers and those who sell, to furnish the best article that can be sup-
plied." Jones v. Bright, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1171 (C.P. 1829).
52 See, e.g., Ward v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918);
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Swift & Co. v.
Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
53 Hillinger, supra note 34, at 800.
54 Id. at 800 (citing Ward, 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225; Ryan, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E.
105; Swift, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203).
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recoup losses from the supplier at fault, courts today justify this
seemingly unjust result as placing the burden on the party better
able to bear the loss, the seller. 55
Summarizing all of these policies, Professor Llewellyn ob-
served, "[w]arranty is a civil obligation. Its purpose, like that of any
civil obligation, is at once to police, to prevent, and to remedy.''56
C. Housing as a Consumer Good
In the nineteenth century, home buyers assured quality by pay-
ing the builder, a skilled artisan, in stages for the work that he had
done.57 After World War II, however, the demand for housing
soared, and the building industry produced houses in large quanti-
ties, inevitably using lower quality materials and often questionable
workmanship. 58 Because buyers often paid for the homes at closing,
they no longer could control quality effectively. One critic noted,
"the building industry outgrew the notion that the builder was an
artisan and took on all the color of a manufacturing enterprise, with
acres of land being cleared by heavy machinery and prefabricated
houses being put up almost overnight." 59 Confronted with these
changes, courts continued to apply caveat emptor to housing sales.60
Many critics, however, pointed out the irony of a system that offered
more protection to a buyer of a defective two-dollar pen than to a
buyer of a million dollar house.6' Reacting to pressures to mitigate
the effects of caveat emptor, courts in many jurisdictions implied war-
ranties of workmanlike construction or habitability in sales contracts
55 It makes sense to place the risk of loss on the seller because his goods caused the
loss. This comports with the policy of imposing strict liability on sellers who sell unrea-
sonably dangerous products. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(a) (1965); see
Hillinger, supra note 34, at 802. Furthermore, the seller can pass along the losses. First,
the seller is better equipped to recoup any loss from the person (his supplier) who actu-
ally caused the loss. Id. Second, the seller can pass on his losses through price adjust-
ments. Id. at 803. Finally, the seller can spread the loss by insuring against it. Id. at
801-02. Justice Cardozo imposed liability on the merchant, reasoning that merchant
liability was "one of the hazards of the business." Ryan, 255 N.Y. 388, 392, 175 N.E.'
105, 106 (1931). See generally Kripke, supra note 43, at 324-25 (noting that one goal of
the U.C.C. draftsmen was "to put the major risk on the professional, or the institutional
party.").
56 Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLum. L. REV. 699, 712
(1936). The policies of the warranty of merchantability resemble the policies behind
strict liability for product defects. See James A. Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension
in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 931-39 (1981) (summarizing the four main
objectives of strict products liability).
57 Roberts, supra note 11, at 837.
58 Bearman, supra note 2, at 542.
59 Roberts, supra note 11, at 837.
60 Id.
61 Bearman, supra note 2, at 541; Haskell, supra note 33, at 633; Roberts, supra note
11, at 835-36.
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for new homes. 62
New York courts also moved to ease the unfairness of caveat
emptor by slowly narrowing its application. 63 Courts often construed
unclear or unconscionable contract clauses against the builders. For
example, in Lutz v. Bayberry Huntington, Inc. ,64 the court determined
that references in the sales contract to the lender's and municipal-
ity's requirement that the builder comply with standards of work-
manship constituted an implied warranty that the builder would
construct the house in a workmanlike manner.65 This expansion of
liability, however, was limited, in that it depended on the specific
contract language in question.66
Eventually, New York courts recognized an implied warranty
based on a consumer theory rather than on ambiguous contract lan-
guage. The De Roche v. Dame67 court noted that buyers' inferior bar-
gaining position forced buyers to rely on builders' superior skill and
knowledge to provide quality workmanship and materials. 68 Be-
cause of buyers' reliance, the court held that, regardless of the con-
tract language, builders were liable for improper construction, on a
theory of implied warranty of workmanlike construction and
62 See cases cited supra note 3.
63 As Leo Bearman noted in 1961:
Even with this rash of vendees seeking relief, the courts were understand-
ably reluctant to overrule flatly a doctrine which had become so deeply
embedded in the common law. Nevertheless with some aid from the leg-
islatures they met the challenge, but by more devious means: they ex-
tended, reshaped and in some instances distorted other areas of the law
to fit their needs. The outcome is that, while caveat emptor is still ostensi-
bly the law applicable to sales of realty in every common law jurisdiction,
it no longer effectively protects the builder-vendor.
Bearman, supra note 2, at 542-43.
64 148 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
65 Id. at 767-68. Another court construed a standard merger clause against the
builder. The court reasoned that the parties did not intend the merger clause to apply
to latent defects. Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct.
1965). The court indicated in dicta that despite any merger clause, contracts for the sale
of homes not yet completed contained an implied warranty of workmanlike construc-
tion. Id- at 330, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 552. Other lower courts adhered to the distinction
between contracts for the sale of completed homes and contracts for construction and
sale of a home. They held that implied warranties of skillful construction existed only in
contracts for sale of incomplete homes. Carter v. Cain, 112 A.D.2d 2, 490 N.Y.S.2d 472
(App. Div. 1985); Dolezel v. Fialkoff, 2 A.D.2d 642, 151 N.Y.S.2d 734 (App. Div. 1956);
Spano v. Perry, 59 Misc. 2d 1062, 301 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1969). But see De Roche v.
Dame, 75 A.D.2d 384, 430 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. Div. 1980); Centrella v. Holland Constr.
Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 537, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
66 See, e.g., Lutz, 148 N.Y.S.2d 762; Centrella, 82 Misc. 2d 537, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832. See
also NEW YORK STATE BUILDERS Ass'N, INC., BUILDERS GUIDE To NEW HOME WARRANTIES
IN NEW YORK STATE (1989) (available by subscription from the New York State Builders
Ass'n) [hereinafter GUIDE].
67 75 A.D.2d 384, 430 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1980).
68 Id. at 387, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
1990] 763
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
habitability. 69
Finally, in 1988, the New York Court of Appeals recognized a
housing merchant warranty in the landmark case of Caceci v. Di
Canio.70 The defendants built the Cacecis' home on soil composed
of deteriorating tree trunks, wood, and other biodegradable materi-
als. After less than four years of occupancy, the kitchen floor began
to dip, and eventually another firm had to pour a new foundation to
eliminate the defect. The Caceci court held that the builder breached
an implied warranty of skillful construction which arose by opera-
tion of law, not contract.71
The Caceci court relied on policies similar to those underlying
the U.C.C. warranty of merchantability. 72 The court noted that be-
cause parties to a housing sale contract do not bargain as equals, the
buyer has to rely on the builder to deliver a house reasonably fit for
the purpose intended. Furthermore, the court noted that requiring
a builder to construct a house free from material defects and in a
skillful manner is consistent with the purchaser's reasonable expec-
tations. In addition, the court reasoned that the builder was in a
better position to prevent major defects. 73 The court placed the re-
sponsibility for defects, "as a matter of sound contract principles,
policy and fairness, . . . on the party best able to prevent and bear
the loss," the builder. 74
II
ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK HOUSING MERCHANT WARRANTY
STATUTE
Only five weeks after the Court of Appeals decided Caceci v. Di
Canio, Governor Cuomo signed into law a housing merchant war-
ranty statute.75 The statute implies a housing merchant warranty
69 Id.
70 72 N.Y.2d 52, 526 N.E.2d 266, 530 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1988).
71 Id. at 56-57, 526 N.E.2d at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772. The court also held that
the merger clause in the contract had no legal effect on these latent defects, and that
Section 251 of the Real Property Law applied to deeds of conveyance, not contracts for
the construction and sale of new homes.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 41-56 for a discussion of the policies behind
the warranty of merchantability in sales of goods.
73 Caceci, 72 N.Y.2d at 59-60, 526 N.E.2d at 269, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
74 Id
75 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
After Caceci, the building industry, fearing the possibly expansive scope of the com-
mon law warranty, pushed for a clearer statute to define its responsibilities. See Letter
from Robert A. Wieboldt of the New York State Builders Association to Evan A. Davis,
Counsel to the Governor (Sept. 1, 1988) (available in the Governor's Bill Jacket) [here-
inafter NYSBA Letter].
One interesting question is whether a cause of action remains under the common
law warranty. The statute does not claim to provide an exclusive remedy for housing
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into all contracts for the sale or construction of new homes.
Although supporters have hailed the statute as a significant step for-
ward,76 it does not completely fulfill the goals that motivated many
states to adopt housing merchant warranties. To fulfill these goals,
the legislature should amend the statute to impose responsibility on
builders for all housing defects that consumers would not reason-
ably expect. The importance of fulfilling the statute's underlying
policies far outweighs the initial costs of these amendments.
A. Basic Warranty Provisions
Section 777-a of the statute implies a three-part housing
merchant warranty by operation of law in all contracts for sales of
new homes,77 in addition to any express warranties the builder may
defects, although it does preempt inconsistent local laws and state statutes. N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 777-b(5)(b)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1990). The Builders Association asserts
that the statutory warranty replaces the common law warranty. See NYSBA Letter, supra,
at 7; GUIDE, supra note 66, at 51. Robert Wieboldt insists that all involved in negotia-
tions over the statute believed that it would constitute a homeowner's exclusive remedy.
Telephone Interview with Robert A. Wiebolt, New York State Builders Ass'n (Dec. 16,
1988).
On the other hand, the New York State Consumer Protection Board cites New York
precedent that statutory remedies exist alongside common law remedies where the stat-
ute does not expressly state that it is an exclusive remedy. Letter from Jean Miller,
General Counsel, New York State Consumer Protection Board, to Evan Davis, Gover-
nor's Counsel 2 (Sept. 1, 1988) (available in the Governor's Bill Jacket) (citing Schuster
v. New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (penal law statute,
which creates an absolute liability against municipal corporations for damages for injury
or death arising from aiding police at their direction in making arrests, does not nullify
common law action for wrongful death)); Odom v. East Ave. Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34
N.Y.S.2d 312, aft'd, 264 A.D. 985, 37 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1942) (statutory remedy granted
under the Civil Rights Act to black guests at a hotel who were refused service in the
hotel restaurant did not preclude the guests from maintaining a cause of action under
common law innkeeper liability)). But see N.Y. STATUTEs LAw § 34 (McKinney 1971)
(statutes creating new rights are exclusive and preempt any other remedies the ag-
grieved party may have had).
76 Senator Paul Kehoe stated, "I believe that this legislation is extremely important
to homeowners of this state, since the purchase of a new home is, in almost all instances,
the largest single purchase a consumer will make." Letter from Senator L. Paul Kehoe
to Evan A. Davis, Counsel to the Governor (Sept. 1, 1988) (available in the Governor's
Bill Jacket); see also NYSBA Letter, supra note 75, at 11 (favoring the bill because it gives
builders clear guidelines to follow). But see Letter from Joanne E. Jenkins, Assistant
Counsel to Office of Business Permits and Regulatory Assistance, to Evan Davis (Aug.
31, 1988) (recommending disapproval because of builders' ability to escape statutory
requirements) (available in the Governor's Bill Jacket) [hereinafter Jenkins' Letter].
77 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-a (McKinney Supp. 1989). The provision further
notes that section 251 has no effect on this implied warranty, and that the warranty does
not merge in the deed but instead survives the passing of title. Id.
Under section 777-b of the statute, a builder may exclude or modify the statutory
warranty, but only if he offers a limited warranty which meets the requirements of the
statute. Some of the policy concerns leading to the U.C.C. and the housing merchant
warranty statute suggest that the statute should not allow builders to disclaim their war-
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make.78
The first part of the statute imposes liability on a builder for
defects that arise during the first year after the warranty date79
caused by the builder's failure to construct a new home in a skillful
manner.80 The second part of the statute imposes a two-year period
of liability on builders for any defects in the installation of a home's
ranties so easily. In fact, some consumer advocates opposed the New York statute be-
cause of section 777-b. See Jenkins' Letter, supra note 76.
On the other hand, the U.C.C. also allows waiver if evidence suggests that the par-
ties negotiated the waiver. Section 2-316(2) allows merchants to exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability if the exclusion mentions merchantability and if the
writing is conspicuous. These requirements ensure that parties negotiate any disclaim-
ers.
The housing merchant warranty also attempts to ensure that builders who disclaim
warranties must bargain for a disclaimer. Limited warranties must meet numerous dis-
closure requirements. If they are not met, then the builder in effect will have given an
express warranty in addition to the statutory housing merchant implied warranty. See
GUIDE, supra note 66, at 54-55.
Because of the strong public interest in habitable homes, all houses must meet
building code standards, and no exclusion can render the house unsafe or uninhabit-
able. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-b(4)(e)(i)-(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1990). Builders may,
however, limit total liability under the act. Id. § 777-b(4)(i). If builders limit their liabil-
ity to a low fixed dollar amount, perhaps only $1.00, then buyers will have no effective
protection under the statute.
If such limited warranties become more common in New York than contracts with
the basic statutory warranty, then the limited warranty provision may frustrate the stat-
ute's goal of protecting the consumer from a builder's defects in circumstances where
the builder usually has a superior bargaining position. As a whole, the statute aims to
compensate for the buyer's inferior position. Where the buyer does have enough bar-
gaining power, section 777-a does not usually imply warranties. For example, the stat-
ute implies no warranties in contracts for the sale of buildings constructed solely for
lease. If most builders decide to use limited warranties, legislators might consider elimi-
nating the limited warranty section of the law.
78 In addition to the basic three-part warranty, the statute implies one other war-
ranty. Stoves, refrigerators, room air conditioners, and other goods sold incidentally
with a home are warranted to be free from defects caused by the builders' faulty installa-
tion. Id. § 777-a(3). Merchantability and fitness of these goods, however, are covered
by the U.C.C., not the housing merchant warranty.
79 Id. § 777-a(1)(a). The warranty period begins at the "warranty date," defined as
"the date of the passing of title to the first owner for occupancy by such owner or such
owner's family as a residence, or the date of first occupancy of the home as a residence,
whichever occurs first." Id. § 777(8). The home building industry's voluntary warranty-
insurance program, "Home Owners Warranty" or HOW, covers defects corresponding
to those in the statute for one, two, and ten year periods. NYSBA Letter, supra note 75,
at 3. The statute follows the HOW periods, except the statute covers material defects
for only six years, not ten.
80 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-a(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990). For a discussion of
the statutory definition of "skillful manner," see infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
For example, if exterior doors warp unexpectedly during the first year and cease to be
weather resistant, the builder has not constructed them in a skillful manner. GUIDE,
supra note 66, at 11I. The example is taken from the Home Owners Warranty Corpora-
tion standards. The NYSBA Builders Guide lists the standards developed by HOW and
incorporated into HOW warranties. The NYSBA suggests that local associations set
standards similar to the HOW standards for all local housing construction. Id. at 104.
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major systems.8' Finally, the statutory warranty covers material de-
fects for six years after the warranty date.82 Material defects83 in-
clude, for example, the sinking floor in the Caceci's home.8 4
Although some cracks and dips may result from a normal settling
process,85 the house contains a material defect when the entire
foundation begins to sink.
B. Limits to the Scope of the Statute and Problems Created by
the Limits
Although the statute does impose an affirmative duty on all
home builders to construct homes in a skillful manner free from ma-
terial defects, it also limits the scope of the warranty in several ways.
First, the statute narrowly defines the terms "skillful manner" and
"material defects." Second, the statute imposes no liability on the
builder for defects he does not cause. Finally, the warranty does not
extend to patent defects.
1. Statutory Language
In Caceci, the Court of Appeals implied a housing merchant war-
ranty, but did not define the terms "skillful manner" and "material
defects." Prior New York courts used the term "workmanlike con-
struction," by which they meant in accordance with accepted local
standards.86 Caceci may have substituted the term "skillful manner"
to free lower courts from their own precedent, allowing a more sub-
jective determination of whether the builder had breached the war-
ranty.8 7 Following Caeeci, a court could determine, for example, that
a home painted in a subjectively ugly color was not constructed in a
81 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777-a(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989). The major systems
covered are "the plumbing, electrical, heating, cooling and ventilation systems of the
home." The two-year warranty covers only the installation of these systems, not the
quality of the materials used. For example, the warranty extends to improperly installed
duct work. A ventilation system's duct work should ordinarily remain intact and securely
fastened. If duct work separates or becomes unattached, the statute would hold the
builder liable. GUIDE, supra note 66, at 129. The installation warranty, however, does
not cover the goods actually installed. If a homeowner discovers that the duct material
itself is substandard, the two-year installation warranty would not apply. Of course, if a
homeowner discovers substandard duct work during the first year of occupancy, the
one-year warranty of construction in a skillful manner would apply.
82 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-a(I)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
83 For a detailed definition of "material defects," see infra text accompanying notes
97-104.
84 Caceci v. Di Canio Constr. Co., 72 N.Y*2d 52, 55, 526 N.E.2d 266, 267, 530
N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (1988).
85 Id. at 56, 526 N.E.2d at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
86 Whitman v. Lakeside Bldrs. & Developers, 99 A.D.2d 679, 472 N.Y.S.2d 51
(App. Div. 1984); De Roche v. Dame, 75 A.D.2d 384, 430 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. Div.
1980).
87 See GUIDE, supra note 66, at 16.
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skillful manner if the buyer reasonably believed he had bargained
for an aesthetically pleasing color. Similarly, the term "material de-
fects" could include only defects that make the home unsafe or unfit
for habitation,8s or it could include practically any defect, latent or
patent. By failing to define these terms, the court left the scope of
the warranty unclear.
The New York statute carefully limited the scope of the housing
merchant warranty. The legislators adopted the Caceci terms, "skill-
ful manner" and "material defect," to describe the basic warranty
coverage. Rather than defining the terms broadly to fulfill the poli-
cies underlying the statute, however, the legislature chose to limit
the terms.
a. Skillful Manner
If a builder fails to construct a home in a "skillful manner," the
statute imposes liability on him for any resulting housing defects
that arise within one year after the warranty date.8 9 A building is
constructed in a "skillful manner" if it does not violate specific
building code standards and does not deviate from locally accepted
building practices in areas where the building code sets up only gen-
eral standards. 90
The statutory definition further limits the builder's duty to con-
form to applicable building codes by imposing no liability on a
builder who violates general code standards. The New York State
Builders Association explains that general code standards "are not
'relevant specific standards' of the code, and the warranty standards
are established by locally accepted building practices." 9' For exam-
ple, the New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code
section 371 requires a safe and healthful environment. If courts
were not confined by the statutory definition, they could base their
interpretation of the phrase "safe and healthful environment" on
reasonable consumer expectations. 92
88 Even that definition is not so precise: the Caceci house was described as not
"habitable" although the Cacecis did not have to move out of it. The Caceci court appar-
ently did not limit material defects to those that fail to comply with building codes or
local building practices. The builder did not violate building codes by failing to do a soil
test on the land, and evidence indicated that failing to do so accorded with local building
practices. Id. at 14-15; see infra note 137.
89 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-a(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
90 Id. § 777(3). See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
91 NYSBA Letter, supra note 75, at 4.
92 For example, they could determine that narrow cracks in a finished wood floor
create an unsafe environment, even if the building code does not prohibit those cracks.
The HOW warranty covers only those cracks in excess of 1/8 inch in width. GUIDE, supra
note 66, at 114. Local standards, of course, may vary, but the New York State Builders
Association urges local associations to adopt the HOW standards. Id. at 104.
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To construct a home in a "skillful manner," a builder needs to
conform only to a state-wide uniform building code, not to local
building codes from the definition.93 Municipalities may adopt
stricter building code standards, but builders who violate them will
not incur liability for failing to construct in a "skillful manner."
Although requiring builders to construct homes in a "skillful
manner" ensures a minimum safety standard, the statute defines
"skillful manner" too narrowly to protect consumers' reasonable ex-
pectations. Because builders must conform to building codes under
existing law,94 consumers clearly expect builders to comply with
them.95 In addition, most consumers reasonably expect a much
higher standard: they reasonably expect and rely on builders to
supply houses without any significant defects. 96
b. Material Defect
While builders must ensure that they build homes free from
"material defects" for six years after the warranty date, again the
statute limits the scope of the warranty by defining "material de-
fects" narrowly. "Material defects" include:
actual physical damage to the following load-bearing portions of
the home caused by failure of such load-bearing portions which
affects their load-bearing functions to the extent that the home
becomes unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise unliveable: foundation
systems and footings, beams, girders, lintels, columns, walls and
partitions, floor systems, and roof framing systems.97
The statutory definition of "material defects" does not include
many defects which courts traditionally considered material. 98
Damages to non-load-bearing portions of the home, no matter how
substantial, do not constitute "material defects" under the Statute.
The narrow definition of "material defects" fails to ensure safe
and habitable homes. Consumers cannot, sue builders for non-
93 The only exception is the New York City Building Code. Section 777(2) defines
"building code" as:
the uniform fire prevention and building code promulgated under sec-
tion three hundred seventy-seven of the executive law, local building
codes standards approved by the uniform fire prevention and building
code council under section three hundred seventy-nine of the executive
law, and the building code of the city of New York, as defined in title
twenty-seven of the administrative code of the city of New York.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777(2) (McKinney 1989).
94 Jenkins' Letter, supra note 76.
95 Haskell, supra note 33, at 641.
96 Id. at 651-53. Of course, minor shortcomings are expected. As Professor Has-
kell noted, "[mierchantability is not perfection; it is a relative concept, depending upon
price and age." Id. at 652-53.
97 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777(4) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
98 NYSBA Letter, supra note 75, at 4.
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structural defects that render a home unsafe or unlivable unless they
discover the defects during the one-year "skillful manner" warranty
period. 99 For example, a buyer who purchases a new home built
with poor insulation may not have the expertise needed to inspect
for adequate insulation. He may remain unaware of the problem
because the aluminum siding added to the outside walls protect the
home from the wind and cold. If, during the second year of occu-
pancy, a section of the aluminum siding falls off the house, exposing
the owner to the wind and rain, he cannot recover damages for the
defects. He cannot recover under the statute for lack of skillful con-
struction because more than a year has passed. Furthermore, the
defects in insulation and siding are not "material defects." The
home is uninhabitable, 100 yet the statute provides the homeowner
with no relief.
By defining "material defects" too narrowly, the statute also
fails to fulfill reasonable consumer expectations. Although consum-
ers generally understand that a home deteriorates over time, they
nevertheless expect its parts to last a reasonable period of time.' 0 '
For example, in Vento v. Honeybee Homes, 102 a home owner sued more
than six years after closing, seeking damages for a leaky roof under
an implied warranty theory. The court denied a motion to dismiss
based on statute of limitations, reasoning that the warranty period
under Caceci equalled "what a reasonable expectation would be that
a house constructed in a workmanlike manner would be free of ma-
99 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777-a(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
100 Section 777-b states that any "exception, exclusion, or standard that fails to en-
sure that the home is habitable, by permitting conditions to exist which render the home
unsafe, shall be void as contrary to public policy." Id. § 777-b(4)(e)(ii). This provision
appears to expand the "material defects" definition to cover our example; however, this
provision applies only to limited warranties builders offer in lieu of the basic statutory
warranty. Hence, no provision in the statute requires the basic statutory housing
merchant to warrant that a home will be habitable.
101 See Robert Williams, Development in Actions for Breach of Implied Warranties of Habita-
bility in the Sale of New Houses, 10 TULSA LJ. 445, 448 (1975) (rejecting a fixed statute of
limitations as too inflexible and arguing for a standard of reasonableness); Note, supra
note 41, at 214 ("[A] standard of reasonableness would provide a better method ofjudg-
ing how long a builder-vendor should be subject to liability than would the fixed statu-
tory period." (footnote omitted)). See generally Haskell, supra note 33, at 652 ("Some
defects in new construction might be considered to constitute breaches of
merchantability although they may not appear until a number of years after the sale.");
Kirgis, supra note 48, at 1082 ("Products are normally warranted for a specified length of
time. Residences can be too; if so, the duration should reflect the relatively long ex-
pected life of residences.").
The three-tier structure of the New York statute reflects a notion that some portions
of the home deteriorate faster than others. Although the point is valid, the statute re-
stricts recovery to one year for many defects that may not arise under normal circum-
stances within that time.
102 141 Misc. 2d 997, 535 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Civ. Ct. 1988). The court decided the case
before the effective date of the new statute.
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terial defects." 103 The statute of limitations for the roof exceeded
six years because a home owner "could reasonably expect that a
well-made roof should last over six years."10 4 The statute, however,
would deny recovery for a leaky roof after the first year, despite con-
sumer expectations.
2. Builder Fault
Although the statute protects consumers from many defects by
imposing liability on builders for their mistakes, and in some in-
stances for the mistakes of their subcontractors, 10 5 builders have no
statutory duty to prevent or correct defects that other people cause.
Section 777-a(2)(a) of the statute imposes liability on builders for
defects that constitute: "(i) defective workmanship by the builder or
by an agent, employee or subcontractor of the builder, (ii) defective
materials supplied by the builder or by an agent, employee or sub-
contractor of the builder, or (iii) defective design provided by a de-
sign professional retained exclusively by the builder." 06
Homeowners who discover latent defects in their homes during the
warranty period must prove that the builder, his agents, or his sub-
contractors caused the defect in order to recover under the statute.
Section 777-a(1)(b), the installation warranty provision, further
limits builder liability. Builders have no statutory duty to prevent
others from installing systems improperly. 10 7 The statute holds
builders liable for improper installation only if the defect is "due to
a failure by the builder to have installed such systems in a skillful man-
ner .... ,,108 Furthermore, because the statute specifically defines a
"builder" as one who contracts with an owner, 109 builders have no
responsibility for their subcontractors' mistakes."10
The provisions limiting builders' liability to instances of their
own fault contravene the statute's underlying policy of protecting
consumers' justified reliance in two ways.' First, the statute en-
103 Id., 535 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
104 Id.
105 Builders are liable for their subcontractors' defective workmanship, materials
and design, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-a(2)(a) (McKinney 1989), but not for their sub-
contractors' faulty installation. Id. § 777-a(1)(b)).
106 Id. § 777-a(2)(a).
107 Id. § 777-a(1)(b).
108 Id. (emphasis added).
109 Id. § 777(1).
110 A homeowner could argue that faulty installation is a type of defective workman-
ship for which the builder is liable under section 777-a(2)(a). The more specific provi-
sion on installation, however, indicates that the legislature intended to treat faulty
installation differently. Thus, the more accurate view is that builders are not liable for
their subcontractors' faulty installation. At any rate, this provision of the statute does
not provide certain protection for the home buyer.
111 Because many consumers are inexperienced in buying homes or in contracting
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courages builders to avoid liability by requiring the home buyer to
pay architects and suppliers directly. The statute imposes builder
liability for defective materials only if the builder or his agents, em-
ployees, or subcontractors cause the defect,' 12 and for defective de-
signs only if the builder exclusively retains the design
professional.' 13 Builders who recommend a particular architect im-
pliedly encourage buyers to rely on their superior knowledge about
the quality of that architect's work. Nevertheless, as long as the
buyer directly pays the architect, the statute exempts builders from
liability for defective design. 114 Similarly, builders who want to
avoid liability for faulty materials may do so by having the buyer
contract directly with the major suppliers.
Second, the statute imposes no builder liability for subcontrac-
tors' faulty installation." 5 Therefore, builders can avoid liability for
faulty installation by using subcontractors rather than employees to
install major systems. Consumers rely on builders to construct
homes free from installation defects, yet consumers normally have
no interest in the identity of the installer. In effect, this provision
requires buyers to ascertain who installed the faulty product to de-
termine whether the warranty applies."16
3. Patent Defects
Section 777-a(2)(b) of the statute specifically excludes from the
warranty "any patent defect which an examination ought in the cir-
cumstances to have revealed, when the buyer before taking title or
accepting construction as complete has examined the home as fully
as the buyer desired, or has refused to examine the home."" 7
with a builder to have him build their home, they rely on the builder's advice in choosing
suppliers and design professionals. In this sense, their reliance is much like that of the
consumer who relies on the merchant to use his skills in choosing reputable manufactur-
ers. Carving out an exception for defects the builder does not cause denies consumers a
remedy for this justified reliance.
112 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-a(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
113 Id. § 777-a(2)(a)(iii).
114 The Builders Association suggests this arrangement to its members, or in the
alternative suggests that builders make sure the design professional is adequately in-
sured. GUIDE, supra note 66, at 46.
115 The Builders Association recommends that "[a]s a precaution, however, builders
should review their plumbing, electrical and HVAC subcontracts to assure that the sub-
contractors will stand behind their workmanship in the event of a warranty claim." Id. at
43. This precaution anticipates judicial interpretations of the provision that would
broaden the coverage. Courts might determine that the plain meaning interpretation
contradicts the consumer protection purposes of the statute, and thus determine that
"builder" in this clause means builder and subcontractors.
116 The buyer may be able to sue the subcontractor for his negligence. Subcontrac-
tors, however, often have no insurance and few resources with which to satisfy a
judgment.
117 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777-a(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
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To justify excluding patent defects from warranty protection,
courts maintain that buyers impliedly agree to purchase homes with
patent defects. 118 Courts reason that buyers have the opportunity
to inspect homes carefully and may want to purchase at a discount
homes with defects. 119 Home buyers with enough bargaining power
may negotiate a lower sales price for a defective home or require a
specific repair agreement covering the defect. 120 In Staff v. Lido
Dunes,12 1 the court enforced an express merger clause as to patent
defects, reasoning:
[t]o the extent that construction defects are discoverable at the
time title closes public policy is not violated by enforcement of the
contract provision, because the purchaser can protect his interests
by either demanding a 'specific written agreement' covering the
defect or refusing to close until it has been corrected. 122
The patent defect exception to the housing merchant warranty
rests, however, on the faulty assumption that consumers can dis-
cover patent defects. Inspection of realty is much more complicated
than inspection of consumer goods. The Caceci court recognized
that "[w]hen a buyer signs a contract prior to construction of a
house, inspection of premises is an impossibility ... " 123 Even in
118 See, e.g., Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 326, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544, 549
(Sup. Ct. 1965) (buyer has no cause of action for patent construction defects unless such
defects are mentioned in the contract).
119 GUIDE, supra note 66, at 47.
120 The Builders Association envisions this type of bargaining. The Association sug-
gests builders should
require buyers to make examination (the traditional 'walk through'
before closing) and to execute an affidavit or other document at the clos-
ing in which the buyer acknowledges that a reasonable inspection was
made and that construction has been completed in a workmanlike man-
ner without defects, except as specified in the document (the traditional
'punch list'). Items on the punch list can be resolved through an agree-
ment to correct them in a specified time or through a credit to the buyer.
The itemized defects will then be patent defects, excluded from the im-
plied warranty.
Id
121 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544.
122 Id. at 326, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 549. The court continued:
[w]ith respect to latent defects, however, the provision if enforced is an
absolute bar to action with respect to defects which by hypothesis are
unknown at the time barred.... Thus, with respect to latent defects, the
cause of action is extinguished at the moment it is created .... [A]n
unreasonably short limitation period is against public policy and
unenforceable.
Id. For a discussion of the court's statute of limitations approach, see REPORT, supra
note 5, at 61.
123 Caceci, 72 N.Y.2d at 59, 526 N.E.2d at 269, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 774. As early as
1815, courts noted that" '[w]here there is no opportunity to inspect the commodity, the
maxim of caveat emptor does not apply.'" Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B.
1815).
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instances where a builder completes the house before the parties
sign the contract, requiring purchasers to inspect may unfairly bur-
den them. As one critic notes, "[i]t is true that a completed home
can to a limited extent be inspected for defects by the vendee before
he signs the contract, but it is equally true that most potential home
owners lack the competency to do their own inspecting."'' 24
Despite evidence that consumers cannot competently inspect
homes, New York courts often have expected them to discover de-
fects that only experts could reasonably find. The court in Staff v.
Lido Dunes125 refused to allow recovery for patent defects. Accord-
ing to the court, the following defects were discoverable on reason-
able inspection prior to closing: "the fuel gauge, fireplace support,
crawl space vents, [and] absence of straps and shims between joists
and girder."' 126 It is difficult to believe that the average consumer
has ever heard of joists and girders, 27 much less that they can dis-
cover defects concerning them.
Most homeowners cannot afford to hire expert examiners to in-
spect for them, either. Although expert examiners can discover lit-
tle about a complete house, 28 they still may charge exorbitant
fees. 129 One critic notes,
[t]he high cost of hiring a skilled examiner would place that partic-
ular safeguard beyond the reach of most vendees, particularly the
average home buyer who has very likely mortgaged heavily in or-
der to purchase even a modest unit in a typical housing develop-
ment .... [A]ny competent inspection after completion would
usually be pecuniarily or practically impossible.13 0
C. Proposed Solution
1. Expand the Statutory Language
To meet consumer expectations and reliance, and to promote
safety and habitability, the legislature should expand the statutory
definitions of "skillful manner" and "material defects" to encom-
124 Bearman, supra note 2, at 545.
125 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
126 Id. at 329, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
127 Joists are the parallel beams that hold up the planks of a floor or the laths of a
ceiling. Girders are the large wooden or steel beams that support the joist. Shims are
thin wedges of wood that fill in spaces. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 706, 558, 1195 (New College ed. 1980).
128 Construction can hide most important defects, such as a sinking foundation.
Many architects are reluctant to inspect houses at all unless they are called in at the
beginning of construction. Bearman, supra note 2, at 545.
129 Id. In 1961, Leo Bearman did an informal survey of Boston architects who esti-
mated their fees would run between $75 to $100 a trip, or $300 to $1000 for a complete
supervision job. These figures are in 1961 dollars. Id.
130 Id. (footnote omitted).
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pass defects that consumers would not ordinarily expect to manifest
themselves during the warranty periods.1 31 A home constructed in
a "skillful manner" would show no defects during the first year.
Although minor defects might manifest themselves in the next five
years, defects to portions of the home "reasonably essential to the
usage of the house" 13 2 would be considered "material defects."
This amendment would not require builders to provide perfect
housing, for consumers recognize that homes deteriorate over time
because of ordinary wear and tear or owner neglect. These pro-
posed definitions of the statutory terms would fulfill consumer ex-
pectations better than the current definitions do. Although
consumers cannot reasonably expect a home to last forever without
damage, most home buyers reasonably expect to discover no hous-
ing defects during the first year of occupancy. 133 They cannot, how-
ever, reasonably expect the warranty to extend to maintenance
problems that normally occur within the first year, damage resulting
from homeowner negligence, or acts of God. 134
Most consumers expect that, for a number of years, the war-
ranty will hold builders to higher standard than the current "mate-
rial defects" definition does. Most consumers would not expect to
find defects to portions of the home "reasonably essential to the use
of the house"13 5 during the first six years of occupancy. Thus, in the
131 An ideal statute from the consumer's perspective would be one with no fixed
statute of limitations. Some commentators have argued for this kind of "reasonable-
ness" standard. See Williams, supra note 101, at 448 (rejecting a fixed statute of limita-
tions as too inflexible and arguing for a standard of reasonableness); Note, supra note
41, at 214 ("[A] standard of reasonableness would provide a better method ofjudging
how long a builder-vendor should be subject to liability than would the fixed statutory
period." (footnote omitted)); cf Note, supra note 1, at 435 ("The first major flaw in the
Minnesota statute is the inclusion of explicit warranties within the text of the statute; this
creates unnecessary rigidity in a rapidly changing area of the law.") (footnotes omitted).
Other critics argue that statutes must provide the building industry with some certainty.
See, e.g., Bearman, supra note 2, at 575; Haskell, supra note 33, at 652.
132 Note, supra note 41, at 210. For further discussion of what consumers consider
reasonably essential, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
133 Note, supra note 1, at 420. Most of the one year warranty coverage can be in-
sured. The HOW warranty covers faulty workmanship and defective materials for one
year. Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program: An Initial Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 357,
360 (1976) (authored by Jonathan L. Kempner).
134 Note, supra note 1, at 423-24.
135 Note, supra note 41, at 210 (emphasis omitted). One commentator argued for
expansion to cover nonstructural defects by comparing the implied warranty of habita-
bility that has grown out of landlord-tenant disputes.
[A] buyer's willingness to contract is in exchange for the seller's promise
to provide a livable dwelling, a package which includes not merely struc-
tural integrity, but nonstructural integrity as well, such as adequate heat-
ing, lighting, and plumbing. It is illogical to extend nonstructural
protection to the $100 a month tenant, but not to the buyer of a $100,000
house.
Id. at 211 (footnote omitted). Moreover, tenants have less at stake and lower expecta-
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hypothetical case where a structurally sound home no longer shel-
ters the resident from the winter, 136 the builder has not met the con-
sumer's reasonable expectations. Reasonable expectations will in
all cases cover major structural or nonstructural defects that render
the home uninhabitable. 137
Reasonable consumer expectations also extend to other non-
structural defects that a warranty of habitability should include.' 38
Consumers reasonably expect not only safe, habitable homes, but
also homes free from cosmetic defects. 139 The statute should im-
pose liability on the builder for all defects the consumer could not
have anticipated, including cabinets that fall off a kitchen wall only
six years after a home is built.
Expanding the statutory definitions also will protect justified
consumer reliance. Purchasers rely on builders' skill and knowledge
in part because they believe that the law protects them. 140 Given
consumer protection laws, home purchasers assume that a guaran-
tee, similar to the warranty on goods, exists when they purchase a
new house.' 4 1 Acting on this assumption, most home buyers will
not "take risk-reducing steps beyond inspecting houses themselves
and inquiring about the builders from whom they buy."' 42 Further-
more, builders often encourage home buyers to rely on their skills,
purposefully creating expectations that purchasers will receive not
"merely liveable but truly wonderful homes."' 143 Because home
buyers must rely on the skill, knowledge, reputation and integrity of
builders, the statute should give full effect to their reliance by ex-
panding the definitions of "skillful manner" and "material defects."
Expanding the statutory definitions will also promote the un-
derlying policies of safety and habitability. 144 Builders who wish to
tions about quality than do new home purchasers. Id.; Note, Housing Defects: Homeowners'
Remedies-A Time For Legislative Action, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 72, 78 (1981).
136 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
137 "Uninhabitable" does not mean that the residents must move out. Instead, the
term means unsafe, unhealthful, or in violation of applicable building codes. See Note,
supra note 1, at 422 n.45.
138 Professor Kirgis notes that a buyer of a new home expects "not only that a build-
ing is habitable, but that it meets some higher standard of functionality and durability."
Kirgis, supra note 48, at 1078.
139 I am indebted to Gene DeSantis, counsel to the Consumer Affairs and Protection
Committee, for his explanation of the effect of the statute on cosmetic defects.
140 Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Doctrine in Residential Property Conveyance:
Policy-Backed Change Proposals, 62 WASH. L. REv. 743, 747 (1987) (authored by Joseph C.
Brown, Jr.).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.; see Dixon v. Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1982);
Frickel v. Sunnyside Enter., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725, 725 P.2d 422 (1986) (Pearson, J.,
dissenting).
144 Discovery of shoddy workmanship spurred on the current movement to require
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retain good reputations have an incentive to construct quality
homes, and the current definition does put some additional pres-
sure on builders to build safe, habitable homes. Holding builders to
the higher standard of the proposed amendments, however, will in-
crease those incentives and thereby provide the best assurance to
buyers that their new homes are safe and habitable.
Initially, broadening the definitions of "skillful manner" and
"material defects" will have significant costs. In the short run, these
broad definitions will burden the building industry.1 45 Because
courts must measure defects against a subjective standard, varying
according to the facts of the instant case and perhaps evolving over
time, builders may find it difficult to plan for future liability. Cur-
rently, only defects in the load-bearing functions of the home are
insurable for the long warranty period under the HOW insurance
plan. 146 Thus, builders may not be able to obtain insurance to cover
liability under this expanded definition. Furthermore, the increased
liability will force builders to inspect their work more carefully, in-
creasing their costs of construction.
These increased costs will burden not only the building indus-
try, but also consumers themselves. If builders spend more on con-
struction of homes because they must self insure, purchase more
insurance, or inspect their work more carefully, then they will at-
tempt to pass these increased costs on to consumers. If they do so,
housing prices will increase in response. Thus, consumers will bear
some of the initial costs of these statutory amendments.
Although the amendment has its costs, its benefits, both for
consumers and for the building industry, outweigh them. The
amendments will fulfill reasonable consumer expectations and reli-
housing merchant warranties in all new home deeds. A memorandum circulated with an
early draft of the New York Assembly bill noted that several news journals "have all
cited the home building industry for turning out shoddy, defective homes and failing to
make repairs. They note that, while the average price of a new home is now about
$63,000, the consumer gets less for his money than ever." Memorandum in Support of
Legislation Assembly Bill 770-A (1988).
145 For this reason, builders might argue that only structural defects that require the
owner to move out should be considered material defects:
Under ordinary principles of contract law, unless the parties have agreed
otherwise, a defect is "material" whenever it significantly impairs the pur-
pose of the contract. Hence, a defect that makes a home unsafe or unfit
for living would be a material defect under a contract for the sale of a
home.
GUIDE, supra note 66, at 16. Although "unsafe or unfit for living" can be construed in
many ways, the builders mean that the defect forces the owner to move out of the home.
Id.
146 The Home Owner's Warranty provides protection for ten years only against
"major construction defects." Major construction defects are defined as damage to the
load-bearing functions of the house. See Note, supra note 1, at 361 nn.20-22 and accom-
panying text.
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ance and encourage the construction of safe, habitable homes. By
meeting the higher standards of the amended statute, builders will
increase consumer confidence in the building industry. Ultimately
this increased confidence should benefit the building industry as
well as housing consumers. Furthermore, imposing increased re-
sponsibility on builders recognizes that they are in the best position
to bear the risk of construction defects. Builders can determine
which suppliers provide quality materials and which architects pro-
duce sound building designs, and the builders can work only with
these reputable business people. For all of these reasons, these stat-
utory amendments will ensure safe, habitable homes at a relatively
low cost.
2. Impose Liability Regardless of Fault
To give full effect to consumer reliance, the legislature should
also amend the law to impose liability on builders regardless of
fault. 147 The statutory protection should exclude, however, damage
from the following causes: owner action or neglect; action taken by
a party under control of the owner; and identifiable acts of God such
as lightning, floods, hurricanes, and possibly insect infestation.
Although adopting a no-fault warranty will impose high initial costs
on the building industry, the change should immediately benefit
home buyers. Furthermore, enhanced consumer confidence in
home building should benefit the building industry in the long run.
Consumers reasonably rely on builders not only to construct
homes skillfully, but also to deliver homes free from any significant
defects caused by anyone. Under a warranty that requires fault,
consumers have no method of determining which potential defects
the warranty covers. To ascertain their own potential liability, buy-
ers would need a list of all suppliers and the supplies they provided,
a list of subcontractors the builder hired to install systems together
147 Ifa no-fault warranty amendment is not politically feasible, a reasonable compro-
mise would hold builders liable for all defects they could have reasonably prevented,
with the understanding that they can sue for contribution or indemnification within one
year ofjudgment. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 777-a(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1990). Cer-
tainly a builder should be liable under the statute for his subcontractors' and other
agents' work. The legislature should close the loophole that shelters builders from lia-
bility for subcontractors' faulty installation. Furthermore, builders should stand behind
the materials they use regardless of who pays for them, and if they do not, the statute
should require them to disclose that fact to the buyer. (Some buyers contracting for a
builder to construct a home may want the builder to use inferior materials in an effort to
cut costs. If that is the case, the purchaser should have to sign a waiver of some sort or
the warranty should be expressly disclaimed according to the statute. As it now stands,
as long as the builder does not directly contract with the supplier, no implied warranty
exists.) Finally, if design professionals whom the builder recommends or requires cause
defects, the builder should be liable for those defects. This compromise would serve the
policies of the warranty better than the current statute does.
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with a description of their work, and a list of all people who walked
through the home during construction and who might have caused
some damage. Only with this information can the buyer attempt to
discover the limits of the builder's responsibility. The legislature
must know that as a practical matter consumers cannot protect
themselves in this way. Instead, consumers should be able to as-
sume that the warranty protects them against loss from all housing
defects, regardless of builder fault.
The New York State Builders Association lobbied heavily for
the fault requirement of the current statute. 148 Presumably, the As-
sociation feared the high initial costs of a no-fault scheme. Under
the amended statute, builders will have to pay for errors they did
not cause, which will increase builders' insurance costs. Further-
more, the burden of proving causation will shift to builders. Under
the current scheme, an aggrieved buyer must prove that the builder
caused the housing defect to recover damages. With the amend-
ment, courts should hold builders liable for defects unless the
builder demonstrates that an enumerated exception applies. Thus,
builders' litigation costs may increase under the amendment, part of
which ultimately would be passed on to consumers.
The fault requirement itself, however, costs society more than
its elimination would. The increase in builders' insurance costs
does not represent a net drain on society. Under the current statu-
tory scheme, the unlucky homeowner who buys a defective home
bears the risk that he may not be able to prove that the builder
caused the defect. The elimination of the fault requirement will
spread this risk of loss throughout society. Similarly, the amend-
ment will not increase overall litigation costs. Instead, the costs will
shift to the builder, who in turn will spread the risk, either through
an insurance policy or through increased housing prices.
Extending warranty coverage to defects that the builder did not
cause fairly places the risk of loss on the less innocent party and on
the party better able to bear the risk. Several courts have recog-
nized the equity of imposing liability regardless of fault on builders
who sell defective homes.' 49 These courts reason that of the two
parties, the builder can more easily guard against defects in the
home and more easily protect himself against potential but un-
known defects.' 50 As one court noted:
Although hindsight, it is frequently said, is 20-20 and defend-
ants used reasonable prudence in selecting the site and designing
148 GUIDE, supra note 66, at 83-84.
149 See, e.g., Lane v. Trenholm Building Co., 267 S.C. 497, 503, 229 S.E.2d 728, 731
(1976); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 435, 457 P.2d 199, 203-04 (1969).
150 Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 128, 288 A.2d 771, 777 (1972).
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and constructing the building, their position throughout the pro-
cess of selection, planning and construction was markedly supe-
rior to that of their first purchaser-occupant. To borrow an idea
from equity, of the innocent parties who suffered, it was the
builder-vendor who made the harm possible. If there is a compar-
ative standard of innocence, as well as of culpability, the defend-
ants who built and sold the house were less innocent and more
culpable than the wholly innocent and unsuspecting buyer.15'
Extending warranty protection to all housing defects, regardless of
builder fault, will give full effect to consumer reliance and more
fairly allocate the risk of loss.
Ultimately, the building industry also should benefit from the
no-fault warranty. As builders increase the care with which they pre-
vent defects from all causes, home buyers' confidence in builders
will increase. Responsible builders should be able to pass their in-
creased costs on to their buyers, and the industry as a whole should
benefit from the enhanced view consumers have of it. Thus, a no-
fault warranty should benefit the building industry as well as
consumers.
3. Impose Liability for Patent Defects
An exception for patent defects in the housing warranty contra-
venes the policies behind it. The legislature should not assume that
consumers rely on their own judgment with regard to patent de-
fects. Buyers do not observe all stages of construction, and they
lack the skills needed to inspect homes for patent defects. 152 Buyers
must rely on builders' expertise to deliver homes free even from
patent defects. Builders, by contrast, supervise construction and
have the expertise necessary to inspect the home for defects;15 3
therefore, equity suggests that the builder should bear the risk of
loss even for patent defects.
Some buyers may want to purchase a home with known patent
defects for a discount. The statute should not allow these buyers to
recover damages for defects that reduced the contract price. To
solve this problem, one critic suggests that a buyer should "be held
at least to the standard of competence and skill which he in fact pos-
151 McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 297-98, 398 A.2d 1283, 1294 (1979) (citing
House, 76 Wash. 2d at 435-36, 457 P.2d at 203-04). The McDonald court noted that the
Washington court's sentiment was repeated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
which stated that" 'liability is not founded upon fault, but because [the seller] has prof-
ited by receiving a fair price and, as between it and an innocent purchaser, the innocent
purchaser should be protected from latent defects.'" McDonald, 79 N.J. at 287 n.7, 398
A.2d at 1294 n.7 (quoting Lane, 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731).
152 See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
153 For a discussion of the difficulties of inspection, see supra notes 123-30 and ac-
companying text.
780 [Vol. 75:754
NOTE-MN.Y. HOUSING WARRANTY
sesses . . . ,, 154 Unfortunately, litigants will have difficulty demon-
strating buyers' actual knowledge unless the defects are noted in a
written contract. Another solution would exclude from the warranty
all patent defects the' seller disclosed to the buyer. Builders com-
monly disclose known defects to buyers in a "punch list," a list of
defects the parties agree to leave as is.155 Because of this common
practice, builders would not be unduly burdened by a requirement
that they incorporate the "punch list" within the contract. The war-
ranty would cover all patent defects except those listed in a contract
as part of a price negotiation. 56
Although creating a "punch list" is a common practice in the
building industry, some commentators maintain that requiring
builders to disclose the most obvious defects is unfair and ineffi-
cient. One commentator notes, "[c]learly, if the purchaser knows of
the defect, he is not entitled to the protection of the law .... [Ilt is
inappropriate to imply as a term of the contract a promise or repre-
sentation against the existence of the defect."' 57 Essentially, the
commentator suggests that the law should equalize builders' and
buyers' bargaining power, not place buyers in a dominant position.
By providing a remedy for obvious defects, the law seems to allow
double-dipping. If defects are obvious, sales prices may reflect
them. Then, if consumers can recover under the implied warranty,
they in effect recover twice.
This view, however, assumes both a high level of sophistication
among home buyers and a great deal of buyer bargaining power.
Even if a buyer discovers an obvious defect in a home, he may either
assume the builder plans to repair it or be unable to negotiate a
lower contract price. By requiring builders to incorporate their
"punch lists" in the sales contract, the proposed amendment would
bring the defects to the bargaining table. Builders easily could
avoid the double-dipping problem by carefully including all defects
154 Haskell, supra note 33, at 651.
155 GUIDE, supra note 66, at 84.
156 Because builders usually have a better bargaining position, courts may need to
determine if the patent defects were actually part of a contract price negotiation or if the
builder manifested a "take it or leave it" position. If the latter, the patent defect exclu-
sions would violate public policy. Furthermore, the statute should require sellers to
print the exclusions in bold and to show the provisions to the buyer.
Another possibility is to limit "patent defects" to those defects discoverable by a
non-expert that can be seen in a walk-through with the builder. Because a walk-through
would generally be done without going into the attic, looking into the crawl spaces, or
lifting up carpeting, all defects in those places would be latent. Missing shims and straps
would be latent because a non-expert could not discover them at all. See supra note 127
& accompanying text.
157 Haskell, supra note 33, at 65 1; see also Kirgis, supra note 48, at 1089 ("It is ineffi-
cient and unfair to require a seller or lessor to warrant against conditions that should be
reasonably apparent to the average buyer or lessee.").
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in the contract. Although this amendment initially may increase
transactions costs, it eventually should decrease litigation costs. No
longer will courts need to determine whether defects are latent or
patent. Hence, this amendment should actually decrease overall
costs. Even if costs did increase, however, coverage nevertheless
should extend to all patent defects not explicitly disclosed. This ex-
tension will further the policies underlying the warranty without
completely eliminating freedom of contract.
CONCLUSION
Courts, commentators, and legislators have begun to realize
that the modem housing market shares more with the market for
twentieth century consumer goods than the market for nineteenth
century homes. Consequently, courts and legislatures in various ju-
risdictions have implied warranties in housing sales on policy
grounds similar to those that led to the U.C.C. warranty of
merchantability. New York took a significant step forward when it
passed a statutory housing merchant warranty. Unfortunately, the
statute does not fulfill the policy goals that shaped its enactment.
To fulfill these policy goals, the legislature should amend the
statute. It should broaden the statutory definitions of "skillful man-
ner" and "material defects" to reflect consumer expectations and
reliance. The statute should impose liability on builders for all de-
fects regardless of fault. Finally, the warranty should hold builders
liable for all patent and latent defects the parties do not explicitly
exclude in the contract. Although these amendments will increase
builders' initial costs, in the long run they will serve the best inter-
ests of both consumers and the building industry. The amendments
will better align the warranty protection with consumer expectations
about homes they buy, which will increase consumer confidence in
the building industry. Thus, at little cost to society, the proposed
amendments will better serve all the policy goals of the housing
merchant warranty.
Amy L. McDaniel
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